

## Message Text

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TO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM IMMEDIATE

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AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE

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NODIS

FOLLOWING REPEAT LONDON 01792 ACTION SECSTATE 1 FEB QUOTE

S E C R E T LONDON 01792

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DEPARTMENT PASS USMISSION USUN NEW YORK (FOR YOUNG),  
AMEMBASSIES PRETORIA, LUSAKA, MAPUTO, DAR ES SALAAM

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PFOR, RH' UK, US

SUBJECT: SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON RHODESIA

SUMMARY: THE CHANCES FOR A SETTLEMENT IN RHODESIA HAVE  
DETERIORATED CONSIDERABLY OVER THE LAST SEVERAL WEEKS.

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THE GROWING EXCLUSIVE RECOGNITION OF THE PATRIOTIC  
FRONT, THE LIKELY ISOLATION OF MUZOREWA AND THE WIDE  
SUPPORT HE ENJOYS, AND SMITH'S REJECTION OF THE NEW  
BRITISH PROPOSALS HAVE DEEPENED THE POLITICAL DIVISIONS  
IN RHODESIA ALMOST BEYOND REPAIR. WITH DIFFERING TRIBAL  
INTERESTS COMPOUNDED BY DIFFERING REGIONAL INTERESTS  
COMPOUNDED BY DIFFERING EXTRACONTINENTAL INTERESTS,  
ANOTHER PERHAPS MORE BRUTAL ANGOLA IS SHAPING UP. TO RE-  
VERSE THESE DANGEROUS TRENDS AND TO ASSURE AN OPPOR-  
TUNITY FOR THE MAJORITY OF RHODESIANS TO CHOOSE THEIR OWN  
GOVERNMENT, WE BELIEVE IT IS ESSENTIAL A) TO BRING NKOMO

INDEPENDENTLY BACK TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE, AND B) TO EFFECT SMITH'S DEPARTURE FROM THE POLITICAL SCENE. AS DIFFICULT AS THESE OBJECTIVES MAY BE, WE DO NOT FORESEE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT ANY OTHER WAY. OUR CONSULTATIONS WITH THE BRITISH SHOULD AIM AT DEVELOPING SPECIFIC STEPS TOWARDS THESE GOALS. END SUMMARY

1. THERE ARE POINTS OUTLINED BELOW WHICH WE BELIEVE ARE WORTH DEBATING AS WE DECIDE WHICH DIRECTION TO TAKE FOL-

LOWING IAN SMITH'S REJECTION LAST WEEK OF THE NEW BRITISH PROPOSALS. OUR UNDERLYING ASSUMPTION IS THAT EVENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, AND MOST IMMEDIATELY IN RHODESIA, ARE FAST SLIPPING BEYOND THE REACH OF WESTERN INFLUENCE. THE TIME FOR ANY SORT OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN RHODESIA MAY HAVE ALREADY PASSED AND. IF SO, WE CAN LIKELY LOOK FORWARD TO VIOLENT YEARS AHEAD IN WHICH OUR INTERESTS IN THE REGION AND IN MOST OF THE REST OF THE CONTINENT WILL SUFFER INCALCULABLY. IF TIME DOES REMAIN, IT IS BRIEF.

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A) GENERAL THOUGHTS

2. WE DO NOT BELIEVE A RHODESIAN AGREEMENT IS LIKELY TO EMERGE WHICH EMBRACES ALL ELEMENTS OF THE DISPUTE. ON THE ONE SIDE, SOME BLACK LEADERS (MOSTLY ZIPA) AND THEIR SPONSORS HAVE LITTLE INTEREST IN NEGOTIATIONS AND LITTLE INTEREST IN AN AGREEMENT WHICH PROVIDES EITHER FOR INTERIM WHITE PARTICIPATION, WHICH IS BASIC TO A TRANSITION GOVERNMENT, OR ELECTIONS, WHICH THEY WOULD LOSE. AS TIME PASSES, THESE LEADERS WILL CONTINUE TO GAIN INCREASING MILITARY STRENGTH AND INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE, AND A SETTLEMENT A YEAR OR TWO FROM NOW WHICH EXCLUDES THEM WOULD BE INCONCEIVABLE. ON THE OTHER SIDE, THE RHODESIAN WHITES KNOW THEY WILL BE PRESSURED BY THE AMERICANS AND SOUTH AFRICANS TO SETTLE WITH MODERATE NATIONALISTS. BUT THAT SOUTH AFRICANS AT LEAST WILL NOT FORCE THEM TO SETTLE WITH RADICALS. THE WHITES BELIEVE THAT AN AGREEMENT WHICH TRANSFERS POWER TO THE "RADICAL" PATRIOTIC FRONT IS PRECISELY WHAT THE ANGLO/AMERICAN EXERCISE OF THE LAST FEW MONTHS WAS DESIGNED TO AVOID. THEY READ RICHARD'S PROPOSALS AS A SURRENDER TO THE RADICALS.

3. IT IS THEREFORE UNPROMISING TO SEEK A SETTLEMENT WHICH ACCOMMODATES ALL RHODESIAN ELEMENTS. EXCEPT TO ESTABLISH THAT THE EFFORT INDEED HAS BEEN MADE. IF OUR INTERESTS IN RHODESIA ARE A) TO ASSURE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A GOVERNMENT SUPPORTED BY THE MAJORITY; AND B) TO PRESERVE STABILITY AND WESTERN INTERESTS. WE SHOULD WORK FOR AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN REASONABLE WHITES. WHICH MEANS

CHANGES IN THE LEADERSHIP OF THE RHODESIA FRONT, AND MODERATE BLACKS, WHO STILL REPRESENT THE GREAT MAJORITY OF THE AFRICAN POPULATION. THE ENDS OF THE RHODESIA POLITICAL SPECTRUM ARE IRRECONCILABLE; THE BROAD CENTER PROBABLY STILL HAS A FEW MONTHS IN WHICH AN AGREEMENT  
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MIGHT BE REACHED.

4. A SEPARATE PEACE MUST INCLUDE JOSHUA NKOMO AND ONE OTHER PROMINENT NATIONALIST LEADER. MOST LIKELY ABEL MUZOREWA. ALTHOUGH INCREASINGLY BITTER AND DRAWN TO THE LEFT, NKOMO IS STILL AN OLD-LINE NATIONALIST INTERESTED IN NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES. HE KNOWS THAT HIS BEST CHANCES FOR POWER IN ZIMBABWE LIE IN NEGOTIATIONS, AND THAT HIS POLITICAL POSITION WILL ERODE IF GUERRILLAS ARE TO DECIDE THE OUTCOME. AT THE SAME TIME, NKOMO IS DUBIOUS OF HIS OWN SUCCESS IN NATIONAL ELECTIONS AND ENTERTAINS AN ENORMOUS PERSONAL ANTIPATHY FOR THE BISHOP. MUZOREWA, FOR HIS PART, HAS CONSIDERABLE POPULAR SUPPORT WHICH HE CANNOT TRANSLATE POLITICALLY EXCEPT IN ASSOCIATION WITH ANOTHER MAJOR NATIONALIST FIGURE. (WE DO NOT MEAN TO DISMISS MUGABE OR THE PATRIOTIC FRONT IN THIS DISCUSSION BUT ONLY EMPHASIZE THAT NKOMO INDEPENDENTLY IS KEY TO REVERSING THE PRESENT COURSE OF EVENTS.) THE CHANCES ARE THAT NKOMO AND MUZOREWA NEED EACH OTHER IF EITHER IS TO BE SURE OF A LEADERSHIP ROLE IN AN INDEPENDENT ZIMBABWE, AND SUCH A COALITION IS POSSIBLE IN THE RIGHT CIRCUMSTANCES. THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES ARE NOT LIKELY TO EMERGE WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT WESTERN ACTIVITY SOON.

5. ON THE WHITE SIDE, SMITH MUST GO. HE EMBODIES ALL THAT THE NATIONALISTS SUSPECT, MISTRUST, AND ABHOR. HE WILL ALWAYS BE REGARDED BY THE NATIONALISTS AS A LEOPARD AMONG THE ANTELOPE. THERE IS SIMPLY NO DEALING WITH HIM, THEY BELIEVE, NO MATTER HOW FESTOONED WITH GUARANTEES AND SAFETY DEVICES AN AGREEMENT MIGHT BE. SMITH'S DEPARTURE EITHER BEFORE OR SHORTLY AFTER A TRANSITIONAL PROCESS HAS BEGUN MUST BE A GIVEN IN ANY NEW APPROACH. AS HARD AS SMITH'S EXIT MAY BE TO ACHIEVE--WE ASSUME ONLY THROUGH VORSTER--IT HAS NOW BECOME A PREREQUISITE. AND OF ALL THE ENTICEMENTS WHICH MIGHT BRING JOSHUA NKOMO ON HIS  
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OWN TO SETTLEMENT TALKS, SMITH'S POLITICAL DEMISE IS AMONG THE MOST ATTRACTIVE.

6. WE HAVE NOT TRIED TO CONSTRUCT A NEW FORMULA FOR A NEGOTIATING FRAMEWORK AS FORMULAS FOR THE MOMENT SEEM

LESS IMPORTANT THAN THE POLITICAL FORCES WHICH CAN MAKE AN AGREEMENT WORK. WE NEVERTHELESS SEE SOMETHING BETWEEN ANNEX C AND DOCUMENT X, AGREED BY THE RHODESIAN FRONT (DAVID SMITH) AND A RECONSTITUTED ANC (MUZOREWA AND NKOMO), AND RESTING ON NAMING NAMES. ELEMENTS THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ARE A) THE APPOINTMENT OF A BLACK PRESIDENT AND A BLACK PRIME MINISTER; NKOMO MUST BE GUARANTEED ONE OF THESE POSITIONS; B) A TRANSITIONAL CABINET WITH MORE THAN ONE-THIRD WHITE PARTICIPATION BUT A PROPORTION OF THE WHITES APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT OR PRIME MINISTER; C) A MAJOR BRITISH ROLE IN A NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AS NOW ENVISAGED BUT ALSO PROVISION FOR THE PRESIDENT OR PRIME MINISTER TO APPOINT A NUMBER OF SENIOR OFFICERS FROM THE PRESENT SECURITY FORCES, FROM THE GUERRILLA ARMIES, AND FROM THE COMMONWEALTH; D) BRITISH CHAIRMANSHIP OF A CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION; E) A SWIFT LEGITIMIZING OF THE AGREEMENT, E.G., A ONE-MAN ONE-VOTE REFERENDUM ORGANIZED BY THE BRITISH ON WHETHER THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT ARE ACCEPTABLE TO THE AFRICAN POPULATION; A RESOUNDING VOTE IN FAVOR WOULD LEGITIMIZE THE AGREEMENT INTERNATIONALLY AND HAVE THE ADDITIONAL BENEFIT OF GIVING NKOMO AND MUZOREWA SOMETHING TO WORK ON TOGETHER.

7. AN UNFETTERED SEPARATE PEACE WOULD CONVINCE AT LEAST ZAPU GUERRILLAS TO LAY DOWN THEIR ARMS AND PROBABLY ENTICE MANY ZANU GUERRILLAS HOME EITHER BECAUSE THEY SUPPORT MUZOREWA (OR SITHOLE, ASSUMING HE IS PART OF THE GOVERNMENT) OR BECAUSE THEY NO LONGER SEE THE SENSE IN FIGHTING A TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT THAT IS MOSTLY BLACK RATHER THAN WHOLLY WHITE.

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8. WE DO NOT THINK THAT THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS WOULD EITHER OBJECT OR BE IN A POSITION TO OBJECT IF SUCH AN AGREEMENT WERE PURSUED AND AGREED QUICKLY. IF NKOMO IS IN, AND IF SMITH IS OUT, AND IF THE SETTLEMENT IS ENDORSED BY THE MAJORITY OF ZIMBABWEANS, THERE ARE ONLY NARROW GROUNDS FOR PROTEST.

B) BRITISH ATTITUDES

9. THE BRITISH ARE DISAPPOINTED BUT NOT SURPRISED BY IVOR RICHARD'S FAILURE. THEY FELT GENTLY CONNED BY THE EXERCISE LAST SEPTEMBER AND COMMITTED TO A COURSE WITH WHICH THEY WERE UNCOMFORTABLE AND ABOUT WHICH THEY HAD MISGIVINGS. MOREOVER, THEY FELT CONFINED BY AMERICAN COMMITMENTS THEY DID NOT WHOLLY ENDORSE. THE BRITISH HAVE TRIED TO KEEP SOME SMALL DISTANCE FROM US TO PRESERVE THEIR OWN OPTIONS AND TO GUARD THEIR WIDER INTERESTS IN AFRICA. THEY NEVER WHOLLY BELIEVED SMITH'S COMMITMENT TO MAJORITY RULE IN SEPTEMBER AND SUSPECTED

THAT WE ON OUR FIRST OUTING WITH SMITH HAD BEEN DECEIVED AS THEY HAD BEEN SO OFTEN IN THE PAST.

10. THE BRITISH NOW ARE UNSURE HOW FAR WE WILL GO TO PRESS VORSTER TO PRESS SMITH. THEIR INFLUENCE IN PRETORIA IS NIL WHICH HAS MADE ALL THEIR PREVIOUS EFFORTS IN RHODESIA FUTILE. THEY BELIEVE OUR INFLUENCE IS GREAT BUT THAT WHILE WE SUPPORTED THE RICHARD MISSION WE DID NOT DO SO ENTHUSIASTICALLY. SMITH SENSED THIS INCOMPLETE CIRCLE, AND ACCORDINGLY MADE RICHARD LOOK SILLY. THE BRITISH WILL BE TAKING A CAREFUL READING OF THE NEW ADMINISTRATION IN WASHINGTON BEFORE THEY AGAIN JOIN IN AN ANGLO/AMERICAN INITIATIVE AND PERHAPS AGAIN FIND THEMSELVES ON A LIMB.

11. THE BRITISH NEED NO CONVINCING THAT A RHODESIAN SETTLEMENT CANNOT BE ATTAINED SO LONG AS IAN SMITH IS ON  
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THE SCENE. THEY HAVE LONG FELT THAT SMITH IS AN OBSTACLE NOT AN INSTRUMENT OF PEACE. RECENT EVENTS HAVE ONLY SUPPORTED THIS VIEW.

12. THIS LATEST EXPERIENCE HAS CONFIRMED WHITEHALL'S WORST EXPECTATIONS ABOUT THE RHODESIAN WEB. THE INCLINATION HERE IS TO PLACE GENEVA/RICHARD ALONGSIDE TIGER, FEARLESS, AND PEARCE. IF ONE ACCEPTS THAT TIME IS VITAL TO REVERSE THE COURSE OF RHODESIA DEVELOPMENTS, THEN IT IS UNLIKELY THAT A DRAMATIC CHANGING OF GEARS WILL COME FROM HERE. OUR "SUPPORTING" BRITISH POLICY ON RHODESIA THEREFORE WILL NOT BE ENOUGH. WHILE THE EFFORT MUST CONTINUE TO BE ANGLO/AMERICAN, INITIATIVES WILL HAVE TO COME FROM WASHINGTON FOR THERE WILL BE LITTLE LEADERSHIP FROM LONDON.

C) LINES OF ACTION

13. OUR PUBLIC STATEMENTS SHOULD EMPHASIZE MAJORITY RULE AS THE FUNDAMENTAL INGREDIENT OF A FINAL SETTLEMENT; WE CANNOT ENCOURAGE ANY GOVERNMENT, REGARDLESS OF RACIAL COMPOSITION, WHICH IS IMPOSED BY A MINORITY.

14. OUR PUBLIC STATEMENTS CANNOT RELY ON RHETORIC WHICH MAY OBSTRUCT OR CLOSE OUR CHANNELS TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT. THE SOUTH AFRICANS ARE AN INDISPENSIBLE ELEMENT IN ACHIEVING A SETTLEMENT, AND WE LOSE OUR CAPACITY TO INFLUENCE EVENTS IN THE REGION IF WE LOSE OUR CAPACITY TO INFLUENCE VORSTER. WE MUST BE STRAIGHT-FORWARD AND TOUGH WITH THE SOUTH AFRICANS BUT AVOID RHETORIC AND HISTORICALS. IT IS PROBABLE THAT IF THE SOUTH AFRICANS SENSE A DEEP HOSTILITY IN WASHINGTON, THEIR ATTITUDES MAY BE BEYOND OUR INFLUENCE.

15. WE MUST MAKE OUR CONCERNS AND VIEWS KNOWN TO AFRICAN  
LEADERS BEYOND THE FRONT LINE STATES. IN A CONTROVERSIAL  
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SETTLEMENT, THE OPINIONS AND ACTIONS OF THESE OTHER  
GOVERNMENTS CAN BE CRUCIAL NOT ONLY OF THEMSELVES BUT  
ALSO IN THE WAY THEY INFLUENCE THE FRONT LINE PRESI-  
DENTS. NIGERIA IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT, AND WE SHOULD  
MAKE EVERY EFFORT NOW TO CONSULT WITH OBASANJO.

16. AN IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVE IS TO FORESTALL SMITH'S  
EFFORTS TO EXECUTE AN "INTERNAL OPTION". AN INTERNAL  
OPTION COUPLED WITH EXCLUSIVE RECOGNITION OF THE  
PATRIOTIC FRONT WOULD PROBABLY MAKE RHODESIA'S POLITICAL  
GAP UNBRIDGEABLE BY ANY AGREEMENT. WE SHOULD RE-  
EMPHASIZE TO VORSTER OUR VIEWS ON A NARROWLY BASED  
INTERNAL OPTION. WE MIGHT ALSO TAKE UP SMITH'S STATEMENT  
THAT HE HAS NOT CLOSED THE DOOR TO NEGOTIATIONS BY SUG-  
GESTING TO HIM THAT THE FIVE POINTS WILL NOT WORK AND  
THAT ANNEX C IS FLEXIBLE, AND ASKING HIM TO COME UP WITH  
SUPPLEMENTARY PROPOSALS THAT WE COULD STUDY.

17. WE SHOULD OPEN UP THE PROCESS OF CONSULTATIONS WITH  
OUR NATO ALLIES, WITH THE EC, WITH JAPAN AND IRAN, AND  
URGE THAT THEY EXPRESS THE VIEW TO VORSTER THAT SMITH  
WILL SIMPLY DRAG HIM DOWN.

18. IVOR RICHARD HAS PROBABLY USED UP HIS CREDIT IN  
SOUTHERN AFRICA. THE BRITISH MAY CONCLUDE THAT RICHARD  
IS NO LONGER THE RIGHT MAN TO REPRESENT BRITAIN IN THESE  
EFFORTS. CROSLAND WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE UNHAPPY TO SEE  
HIM RETURN TO THE UN, BUT A SUCCESSOR WILL NOT BE EASY  
TO IDENTIFY.

19. IT HAS BEEN TEN MONTHS SINCE THE KISSINGER COMMIT-  
MENT IN LUSAKA TO PRESS VIGOROUSLY FOR REPEAL OF THE  
BYRD AMENDMENT. BY NOW, IT IS PROBABLY BETTER TO MAKE  
THE EFFORT AND POSSIBLY FAIL THAN TO MAKE NO PUBLIC  
EFFORT AT ALL.

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